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RECENT CASE NOTES
ASSAULT AND BATTERY-POLICE OFcER-THIRD DEGREE-Each of the
appellants was charged with assault and battery, and the cases were consolidated and tried together and each was found guilty. The evidence
showed that a man was arrested and taken to the police station; that
appellants were plain clothes detectives, and took the man to the "detectives'
room," where they gave him the "third degree" at a time when there was
no charge filed against him; accused him of theft, called him vile names,

and tried to make him confess, threatening him with bodily injury.

One of

the appellants struck him with his fist, and both beat him with a rubber
hose. Appellants swore that they committted these acts in self-defense;
one of appellants weighed 180 pounds and the other 230 pounds. Appellants were tried in the Allen County Circuit Court, and moved for an
instructed verdict for the defendants on the ground that they were prosecuted under the wrong statute, there being a special statute against using
force to obtain a confession. Held, the evidence was sufficient to support
the charge of assault and battery, there being many acts that offend
against more than one statute.'
The first question to be asked is: What protection have the courts
afforded against third degree methods? A review of the cases reveals
three methods which the courts have used to combat "third degree"
methods:
(1) Any evidence obtained by such methods will be excluded by a trial
court, or the judgment will be reversed if such evidence is admitted in
2
the lower court.

(2) Police officers using unnecessary force on prisoners, including at3
tempts to extort confessions, will be prosecuted criminally.
(3) The individual subjected to such methods will be given civil
4

redress.
It will be noted that all these are indirect remedies assuaging the

wrong after it is committed, and in no way empowering the judiciary to
exert any prior control to prevent the wrong. Is there any method whereby
the courts can exert direct control? Could the courts exert direct control

by acknowledging "third degree" methods to be under the protection of the
The Federal Conself-incrimination clauses of the various constitutions?
stitution and those of all the states except Iowa and New Jersey have
Boaahoon v. State, 178 N. E. 570, Sup. Ct. of Ind., Dec. 10, 1931.
Wan v. United States, 266 U. S. 1; Tramp v. State, 104 Neb. 222, 176 N. W.
543; Cooper v. State, 237 Pac. 865; Cross v. State, 142 Tenn. 510, 221 S. W. 489;
Mangumn v. United States, 2S9 Fed. 213; Roman v. State, 23 Ariz. 67, 201 Pac. 551;
People v. Rogers, 303 Ill. 578, 136 N. E. 470; Franklin v. Commonwealth, 201 Ky.
324, 256 S. W. 714; Dickson v. Commonwealth, 210 Ky. 350, 275 S. W. 805; King v.
State, 108 Neb. 42S, 1S7 N. W. 934; White v. State, 243 S. W. 690; Thurman v.
State, 169 Ind. 240, 82 N. E. 64 (admitted on facts) ; Edmondson v. State, 72 Ark.
585, 82 S. W. 203; State v. Young, 27 So. 50; State v. Dildy. 72 N. C. 327; Warren
v. State, 29 Tex. 360; Beckham v. State, 14 So. 859; United States '. Balayut, 1
Phil. 451.
3 United States v. Pabalan, 37 Phil. 352; United States v. Frank, 6 Phil. 433;
Durham v. State, 199 Ind. 567; People v. Rogers, 303 Ill. 578, 136 N. E. 470.
4State ex rel. Burns v. Clausmeier, 154 Ind. 599; Firesttone v. Rice, 38 N. W.
855 (Mich.) ; Atwood v. Atwater, 61 N. W. 574 (Neb.).
1
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incorporated the rule of the privilege against self-incrimination. The
problem is: When does the protection of the privilege arise? To determine
this it is necessary to examine the cases and the wording of the provisions
under which they arise, and in connection with which they are interpreted.
A clause exempting from self-criminating testimony "in criminal cases"
protects equally in civil cases when the fact asked for is a criminal one.5
The protection under all clauses extends to all manner of proceedings in
which testimony is to be taken, whether litigious or not, and whether
"ex parte" or otherwise. It therefore applies in all kinds of courts, including juvenile courts when constituted as criminal courts and in all methods
of interrogations before a court.7 It will be noted that thus far there is
definitely a "case," before the court, and these principles are so well settled, that they are unquestioned by any except ignorant or over-skilled
counsel, raising a dust in an effort to confuse the court. But the protection
extends farther; it has been held to extend to investigations before a grand
jury. This will be discussed from the aspects of our double sovereignty.
Under the Federal ConstitutionalProvisions:
(a) The fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution provides: "No
person * * * shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself." How far back does this protection extend? The Fifth
Amendment extends its protection to a witness called to testify before a
grand jury which is investigating alleged violations of the interstate commerce law; it is not limited to cases of criminal prosecution against the
witness himself.8 When a witness called before a grand jury is granted by
statute an absolute immunity from prosecution, penalty or forfeiture, he
cannot claim the protection of the Fifth Amendment,9 the inference being
that he could claim constitutional protection were he not so protected.
Under State Constitutional Provisions:
(a) New York. The constitution provides that "No person shall * * *
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."O It
was held unconstitutional to deny a witness his privilege and immunity,
when he was called before a grand jury investigating charges against
himself."1
(b) Kentucky. The constitution provides that "In all criminal prosecutions the accused * * * cannot be compelled to give evidence against
himself."1a Under this, one cannot be compelled to give evidence before a
grand jury of facts disclosed by the witness' own testimony in a prior
12
prosecution against another.
(c) Missouri. The constitution provides that "No person shall be compelled to testify against himself in a criminal cause." One compelled to
testify before a grand jury concerning an investigation involving others is
entitled to the protection of ine constitutional provision.13
5Bx parte Senior, 37 Fla. 1, 19 So. 652; Wilkins v. Malone, 14 Ind. 153.
sEx parte Tahbel, 189 Pac. 804.
T
Pye v. Butterfield, 5 B. & S. 829 (statutory interrogatorlesy.
s Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 12 Sup. CL 195.
9Hae v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 26 Sup. Ct. 371.
10Art. 1, Sec. 6.
n People ex rel. Hacklet v. Kelly, 24 N. Y. 74, 78.
2a See. 11, Bill of Rights.
2Bentler v. Com., 136 S. W. 896.
"state v. Naughton, 120 S. W. 53.

RECENT CASE NOTES
(d) Under similar provisions, like decisions were given in Minnesota,
Ohio and Oklahoma.14
Does a "case" within the meaning of the constitutional provision extend
to investigations by a legislature, or a body having legislative functions?
The constitutional provision against self-incrimination (Deel. of R., Art.
12, Mass.) applies to investigations ordered and conducted by the legislature or either of its branches; is regulated therein by the same rules as in
judicial and other inquiries.15
There is authority, then, that the privilege extends both to judicial and
legislative functions, and it does not seem to be stretching the truth to say
that a "case" includes an investigation by judicial or legislative officials to
determine whether or not there are grounds for a formal action in a court
of law. This would seem to cover, as far as it extends, investigations by
police officers. But does the protection extend to executive and administrative inquiries? To partly meet this: What is a grand jury? In State
v. Cox, 8upra, the protection was held to extend to grand jury investigations. In the same jurisdiction, Ohio, it was held that "the grand jury
does not exercise a judicial function, but only acts as the constitutional
accuser of crime."1 6 The grand jury is certainly not exercising a legislative function. If neither judicial nor legislative, then, under our theory
of the division of powers the inference must be that the protection is afforded to investigations by an administrative body. If the protection
against self-incrimination is afforded to investigations by administrative
officers in one situation, why should it not be afforded to investigations by
other administrative officers, viz., the police? Although the distinction that
a grand jury is not a judicial body is not so flatly stated in other jurisdictions, it is recognized as being different from a judicial body, and in
these jurisdictions the protection has been extended to grand jury investigations.17 As a matter of fact the grand jury is probably a body with
overlapping functions, analogous to the several commissions, boards, etc.,
the constitutionality of which has been declared recently. The federal rule,
however, is that a grand jury is a judicial body.18 In some of the states
not defining the nature of the grand jury, it has not been considered so
inherently a part of the judiciary that it was unconstitutional for the
legislature to take away from the judiciary the power to summon the grand
jury.19

In the principal case, the court twice asserted that although there had
been no formal arrest, the detectives could have been prosecuted under Sec.
2420 Burns 1926, which defines the offense of using force to obtain a confession from a prisoner. If this is true, the court tacitly admits that there
is a "case." If there is a "case" the "prisoner" comes within the consti14 State v. Froiseth, 16 Minn. 296; State v. Cox, 101 N. E. 135 (Ohio) ;
v. State, 9 Okla. Cr. 465, 132 Pac. 933.
s Henry Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172. See Wigmore on Evidence,
ch. 28, Sec. 2252, pp. 853 ff.
16 State v. Price, 101 Ohio St. 50, 128 N. E. 173.
T
I
laus v. Bolster, 146 N. E. 783, 251 Mass. 292; Ward Baking Co. v.
Union Telegraph Co., 200 N. Y. S. 865, 205 App. Div. 723; In re Both, 192
822.
'28n
re National Window Glass Workers, 287 Fed. 219.
"Jasonwski v. Connolly, 197 Mich. 257, 163 N. W. 910.
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tutional protection. The court does bring the situation under the protection of Sec. 15, Art. 1, Indiana Constitution, that "no person arrested or
confined in jail shall be treated with unnecessary rigor." What is necessary rigor? May necessary rigor be used to gain a confession? If not,
then why not give the prisoner the specific protection of the next sentence,
next section in the Indiana Constitution, the protection against self-incrimination? If necessary rigor may be used, then the two sections have the
same linguistic implications, and the prisoner is entitled to the protection
of both or neither.
It may be contended that the writ of habeas corpus would furnish equal
protection under such circumstances. It is asserted here that it would not.
The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to secure a speedy release by
judicial decree of persons illegally restrained or their liberty.20 It is to
summarily protect the liberty of the citizens from unlawful detention. 2 1
But it should never be issued unless the petition therefor shows upon its
face that the prisoner is entitled to be discharged.22 Nor does it have any
purpose to punish the respondent. 23 The distinction between being entitled to freedom and being protected from "third degree" methods seems
obvious enough.
But how would allowing the constitutional protection against selfincrimination help the prisoner until after he had already been subjected
to the third degree? In the all too frequent cases where the third degree
is a matter not only for hours, but of days,2 4 the court would have the
opportunity of properly enjoining any further conduct of this sort, and if
the order were disobeyed, of citing the police officers for contempt. Apparently under the Indiana theory, the same court that issued the order
could punish for the indirect contempt, without a jury, which jury might
be prejudiced in favor of the derelict representatives of law and order.
It may be contended that in jurisdictions with more democratic rules
of contempt, the officer, guilty of an indirect contempt, is entitled to a trial
by a jury for the contempt. Then what would be the advantage? The
answer is this: The question at issue would not be the violation by a police
officer of the privilege and immunities of an individual branded as a criminal suspect, but would be the violation by a police officer of the power of
a court of a sovereign state. It is submitted that the latter would be more
impressive to a jury.
It seems reasonable to assert, then, that a court could grant the protection of the quite general constitutional immunities given against selfincrimination, or there is sufficient authority upon which to base such a
decision reasonably enough. This writer was unable to find any authority
that had expressly denied the privilege, despite the unsupported opinions
of text writers to the contrary. Such a decision would restrict the undesirable activities of police officers and, in the absence of laws removing the
entire matter of investigating criminals from the hands of police officers,
such a decision would seem a highly desirable result.
L. H. W.
Ex Varte Craig, 282 Fed. 138.
r'Bens v. United States, 266 Fed. 152.
22Superior Court v. State, 197 Pac. 537.
'

2People ex rel. Klee v. Kflee, 195 N. Y. S. 778.
2"Wan v. United States, supra, note 2.

